

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

11 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Security Center

SUBJECT : Procedures for Maintaining Accountability  
of TOP SECRET and Compartmented  
Intelligence Documents - Draft No. 4

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Chief, Special Security  
Center, dated 19 September 1972, same  
subject

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1. In accordance with your request I have reviewed Draft No. 4 of the proposed control procedures for TOP SECRET and compartmented materials. I have discussed most of my comments on this latest draft already with  of your office.

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2. For your consideration attached is an annotated copy of Draft No. 4 of the procedures reflecting my recommendations for changes; I have deliberately tried to avoid making editorial-type comment.

3. Most of the comments annotated on the draft pertain to two issues:

a. This new draft implies not only the establishment of uniform procedures for TOP SECRET and compartmented materials but also the establishment of a single system. In assuming responsibility for the management of the Agency's TOP SECRET control program, the Physical Security Division does not foresee the

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establishment of a single control system,  
but only the goal of uniform requirements  
for accountability;

b. In view of the fact that large  
amounts of TOP SECRET and compart-  
mented materials are now in other forms  
than hard-copy documents, I have deleted  
use of the term document from most portions  
of the paper, sometimes substituting the  
word material.

4. Although I readily acknowledge the security problems  
involved in the control of the reproduction of sensitive intelligence  
documents, I believe that the requirements set forth in paragraph  
14 of the draft necessitating the authorization of the originator as  
a basis for reproducing TOP SECRET or compartmented materials  
both impractical and out of date. First of all, I challenge the  
advantage in such rigid control; secondly, this requirement will be  
followed only by scrupulously honest people and is unenforceable;  
thirdly, in the computer environment we are constantly reproducing  
TOP SECRET and compartmented data with absolutely no possibility  
of implementing a system whereby reproduction is controlled by the  
originator. Although my comments on the draft itself do not delete  
paragraph 14 in its entirety, I suggest that serious consideration be  
given to a proposal whereby this paragraph would be amended to  
merely accent the need for limiting the reproduction of such docu-  
ments to the requirements of efficient operation.

5. Draft No. 4 is classified SECRET; I believe that the  
entire paper contains no classified information and should be handled  
simply as "Administrative - Internal Use Only".

  
Deputy Chief for Computer Security  
Physical Security Division

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Distribution:

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- 1 - IPB File: Administrative, Policy, Top Secret Control Function
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OS/PL-SD/IPP (11 October 1972)

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DRAFT NO. 4

*Uniform Control*  
Procedures for [Maintaining Accountability of]  
TOP SECRET and Compartmented Intelligence *Material*  
[Documents]

*Uniform procedures for*

1. [A single system of] document accountability *are* established  
*material*  
in CIA for TOP SECRET and information subject to special compartmented  
systems of security control consistent with the provisions of Executive  
Order 11652 and the several authorities governing the security protection  
of compartmented intelligence information and materials. [The heretofore  
separate functions of TOP SECRET registry and the control of compart-  
mented intelligence information are combined.]

2. Agency Deputy Directors, heads of independent offices, and  
operating officials will serve as the principal levels of accountability for  
all inter- and intra-Agency TOP SECRET and compartmented intelligence  
information correspondence; [the maintenance of an overall CIA TOP  
SECRET registry is no longer required.]

3. Agency Deputy Directors, heads of independent offices, and  
operating officials will *implement* [establish] within their respective offices procedures

~~SECRET~~

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consistent with the provisions of this instruction to maintain accountability for all such materials entering, leaving or maintained by their offices, and will appoint [document] control officers to assist them in the exercise of this responsibility. These [document] control officers will possess TOP SECRET security clearance in addition to access approval for those special compartmented security systems required in the conduct of the business of their offices. [Document] control officers may establish such secondary levels of control within their areas of jurisdiction as are necessary to the maintenance of strict accountability.

4. In the interests of more efficient operation, all Agency couriers--excepting temporary summer employees sometimes assigned to messenger duties--will be cleared and approved for the delivery of TOP SECRET in addition to any document or material which is subject to special compartmented security controls.

5. To assist the processes of accountability, [each] TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence <sup>items</sup> [document] will be assigned a [document] control number. <sup>Items</sup> [Documents] produced in CIA will be assigned a control number by the appropriate [document] control officer; blocks of TOP SECRET control numbers will be allocated to each [document] control officer by the

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Agency TOP SECRET Control Officer <sup>(located in the Office of Security)</sup> control numbers for compartmented intelligence documents are provided by the authorities specified in the several manuals and regulations governing these special systems of security control. TOP SECRET documents received from outside CIA <sup>may</sup> ~~[will]~~ be provided a CIA TOP SECRET control number for the purposes of internal Agency accountability; <sup>facilitating</sup> ~~[in]~~ <sup>normally,</sup> ~~however, in the case of TOP SECRET and always in~~ the case of compartmented intelligence documents, the originator's number will serve as the control device within CIA.

6. <sup>Items</sup> ~~[Documents]~~ transmitted for one deputy directorate, independent office or operating official to another, or to another department or agency of the government <sup>will</sup> ~~[must]~~ be sent via the appropriate document control officers in order to record transfer of accountability. Within their separate areas of jurisdiction, ~~[document]~~ control officers will institute appropriate internal procedures designed to insure accountability of all TOP SECRET and compartmented intelligence <sup>material</sup> ~~[documents]~~ not intended for distribution outside their respective offices. In recognition of the special problems involved in those offices dealing daily with large volumes of such materials, the Director of Security may approve a relaxation of the internal document accountability requirement upon a finding that other appropriate safeguards have been implemented.

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7. TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence <sup>materials</sup> [documents]

may be delivered by any CIA courier service. Within <sup>individual Agency buildings in the Headquarters area</sup> the separate facilities of the Agency Headquarters establishment, <sup>materials</sup> such [documents]

<sup>materials</sup> may be delivered by any Agency employee possessing the required level of security clearance and <sup>access</sup> approval [for access to the document's contents.] Use of an Agency courier service is mandatory in the case of any document transferred outside of any of the several Agency Headquarters facilities.

8. Use of the cover sheets on compartmented intelligence and non-compartmented TOP SECRET documents is optional as long as the document remains within [the] CIA [Headquarters establishment.] Appropriate cover sheets will be used whenever documents are dispatched outside of CIA.

9. TOP SECRET and compartmented intelligence <sup>materials</sup> [documents]

will be delivered in such manner as to preclude inadvertent exposure. When such <sup>materials</sup> [documents] are delivered between or to other points outside the several CIA Headquarters facilities, they shall be enclosed in opaque inner and outer covers prior to transmitting. The inner cover shall be a sealed and addressed wrapper or envelope plainly marked

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with the assigned classification and bearing the special security system indicator marking prescribed by the several authorities governing such systems. The outer cover shall be sealed and addressed, reflecting no indication of the classification of its contents but bearing a return address in addition to the following notice:

PROPERTY OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT  
DO NOT OPEN  
If found please call Washington, D. C.,  
351-6161, Collect.

10. The primary record of accountability is the [document] control log which is maintained by each [document] control officer. [secondary records, not required in all cases, include the document receipt and the courier receipt. Because of innovations in the field of automatic data processing possessing possible application to document control procedures, and because the volume of document control work will vary from office to office, no precise format is prescribed for the document control log; rather, Deputy Directors, heads of independent offices, and operating officials are encouraged to devise innovative procedures which enhance the efficiency of their overall operations, while seeking the advice and guidance of the Director of Security to insure that the system still contains ]

*Further, the outer cover will be clearly marked:*

**VIA COURIER - NOT TO BE TRANSMITTED  
BY ~~SECRET~~ US POSTAL SERVICE**

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[the essential informational elements of document accountability.] These *logs will contain the* essential informational elements of [document] accountability, including:

- a. Document control number,
- b. Originator,
- c. Copy number(s),
- d. Date received/dispatched,
- e. Total number of copies,
- f. Identity of intended recipient.

11. Within and between the several CIA Headquarters facilities, accountability for TOP SECRET and compartmented intelligence [documents] *materials* will automatically pass to the receiving office upon transmittal of the *material* [document]. The respective logs of the sender and the recipient will be used to evidence the transfer of accountability; within and between such facilities the use of document and courier receipts is no longer required, although use of the former is still permissible particularly where the document receipt constitutes an element of the sender's log record. Requests on the part of senders that [document] *of the material* receipt be telephonically acknowledged will be honored by the recipients.

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12. The use of both courier and document receipts in the delivery of TOP SECRET and compartmented intelligence [documents] *materials* [to departments and agencies] outside the CIA is mandatory. Courier receipts will be numbered serially and the number will be inscribed on the corresponding document receipt(s) and on the envelope or wrappers. In the case of compartmented intelligence documents the format of the document receipt will be as prescribed by the several authorities governing the security control of such information; TOP SECRET document receipts will include at a minimum: document number, originator, date dispatched, intended recipient, date received, and copy number.

13. The destruction of TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence documents <sup>will</sup> [must] be accomplished in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Questions concerning the legal authority for the destruction of Government records should be referred to the area records officer. Surplus copies of TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence documents may be destroyed by approved means. <sup>fact and</sup> The date of destruction <sup>appropriate</sup> will be recorded in the [area] log. It is the responsibility of the custodian to inform the appropriate Control Officer of destruction.

14. TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence documents may be reproduced only upon authorization by the originator and reproduction must be limited to the minimum number of copies required for

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*Reproduction*

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*Authorization will be sought through the appropriate*  
efficient operation. <sup>^</sup> Reproduction copies will be controlled in the same  
manner as prescribed for original copies.

*Control officer.*

[ (a) CIA-Produced Documents

Permission to reproduce CIA-originated TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence documents will be obtained from the originator if within the area proposing to reproduce or through the appropriate control officer if in another area.

(b) Non-CIA Produced Documents

Permission to reproduce TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence documents of other than CIA origin will be requested through the receiving control officer. ]

*or suspected*

15. Any known <sup>^</sup>compromise of TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence information, or loss of or failure to account for TOP SECRET or compartmented intelligence documents <sup>will</sup> [must] be promptly reported to the Director of Security, who is charged with the conduct of appropriate investigation of such matters.

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